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Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is widely regarded as the father of modem philosophy. His noteworthy 
contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the 
theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of Descartes' famous work. 
Meditations on First Philosophy.
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1. Conception of Knowledge—Internalist, Indefeasibilist, Methodist, 
Rationalist
1.1 Analysis of Knowledge
Famously, Descartes defines knowledge in terms of doubt. While distinguishing rigorous knowledge 
(scientia) and lesser grades of conviction (persuasio), Descartes writes:
I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction when there remains some reason which 
might lead us to doubt, but knowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never 
be shaken by any stronger reason. (1640 letter, AT 3:64-65)
Elsewhere, while answering a challenge as to whether he succeeds in founding such knowledge, Descartes 
writes:
But since I see that you are still stuck fast in the doubts which I put forward in the First 
Meditation, and which I thought I had very carefully removed in the succeeding Meditations, I 
shall now expound for a second time the basis on which it seems to me that all human certainty 
can be founded.
First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously 
convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have 
any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to 
ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. ... For the supposition which we are 
making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a 
conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. (Replies 2, AT 7:144-45)
These passages (and others) clarify that Descartes understands doubt as the contrast of certainty. As my 
certainty increases, my doubt decreases; conversely, as my doubt increases, my certainty decreases. The 
requirement that knowledge is to be based in complete, or perfect certainty, amounts to requiring a complete 
absence of doubt— an indubitability, or inability to undermine one's conviction. Descartes' methodic 
emphasis on doubt, rather than on certainty, marks an epistemological innovation. This so-called ‘method of 
doubt’ will be discussed below (Section 2).
The certainty/indubitability of interest to Descartes is psychological in character, though not merely 
psychological— not simply an inexplicable feeling. It has also a distinctively epistemic character, involving a 
kind of rational insight. During moments of certainty, it is as if my perception is guided by “a great light in 
the intellect” (Med. 4, AT 7:59). This rational illumination empowers me to “see utterly clearly with my 
mind's eye”; my feelings of certainty are grounded—indeed, “I see a manifest contradiction” in denying the 
proposition of which I'm convinced. (Med. 3, AT 7:36)
Should we regard Descartes' account as a version of the justified true beliej' analysis of knowledge tracing 
back to Plato? The above texts (block quoted) are among Descartes' clearest statements concerning the brand 
of knowledge he seeks. Yet they raise questions about the extent to which his account is continuous with 
other analyses of knowledge. Prima facie, his characterizations imply a justified belief analysis of 
knowledge— or in language closer to his own (and where justification is construed in terms of unshakability), 
an unshakable conviction analysis. There's no stated requirement that the would-be knower's conviction is to 
be tnie, as opposed to being unshakably certain. Is truth, therefore, not a requirement of Descartes' brand of 
strict knowledge?
Many will balk at the suggestion. For in numerous texts Descartes writes about truth, even characterizing a
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“rule for establishing the truth” (Med. 5, AT 7:70, passim). It might therefore seem clear, whatever else is the 
case, that Descartes conceives of knowledge as advancing truth. Without denying this, let me play devil's 
advocate. It is not inconsistent to hold that we're pursuing the truth, even succeeding in establishing the truth, 
and yet to construe the conditions o f success wholly in terms of certainty; that is, to maintain that to establish 
a proposition just is to perceive it with certainty. Note again that Descartes says, of the perfect certainty he 
seeks, that it provides “everything that we could reasonably want,” adding (in the same passage):
What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly 
convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why 
should this alleged “absolute falsity” bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the 
smallest suspicion of it? (Replies 2, AT 7:144-45)
On one reading of this remark, Descartes is explicitly embracing the consequence of having defined 
knowledge wholly in terms of unshakable conviction: he's conceding that achieving the brand of knowledge 
he seeks is compatible with being— “absolutely speaking”— in error. If this is the correct reading, the 
interesting upshot is that Descartes' ultimate aspiration is not absolute truth, but absolute certainty. O f course, 
it should not be ignored (on this reading) that these same remarks imply that achieving this perfect certainty 
entails being unshakably convinced that we're not in error, absolutely speaking.
On a quite different reading of this passage, Descartes is clarifying that the analysis of knowledge is neutral 
not about truth, but about absolute truth: he's conveying that the truth condition requisite to knowledge 
involves truth as coherence.
A definitive interpretation of these issues has yet to gain general acceptance in the literature. What is clear is 
that the brand of knowledge Descartes seeks requires, at least, unshakably certain conviction.
1.2 Internalism and Justification
One way to divide up theories of justification is in terms of the internalism-extemalism distinction. Very 
roughly: a theory of justification is internalist insofar as it requires that the justifying factors are accessible to 
the knower's conscious awareness; it is externalist insofar as it does not impose this requirement.
Descartes' internalism requires that all justifying factors take the form of ideas. For he holds that ideas are, 
strictly speaking, the only objects of perception, or conscious awareness. Independent of this theory of ideas, 
Descartes' methodical doubts underwrite an assumption with similar force: for almost the entirety of the 
Meditations, his meditator-spokesperson— hereafter referred to as the ‘meditator’— adopts the assumption 
that his every thought is occurring in a dream. This assumption is tantamount to requiring that justification 
come in the form of ideas.
An important consequence of the account is that rigorous philosophical inquiry must proceed via an 
inside-to-out strategy— a strategy Descartes assiduously follows, and which endures as a hallmark of early 
modem epistemologies. Ultimately, all judgments are grounded in an inspection of the mind's ideas. 
Philosophical inquiry is, properly understood, an investigation of ideas. The methodical strategy of the 
Meditations is designed to force the reader to adopt this mode of inquiry.
1.3 Indefeasibility in Context
In characterizing knowledge as “incapable of being destroyed,” Descartes portrays knowledge as enduring. 
Our conviction must be, writes Descartes, “so strong that it can never be shaken”; “so firm that it is 
impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting.” Descartes wants a brand of certainty/indubitability 
that is of the highest rank, both in terms of degree and durability. He wants knowledge that is utterly
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indefeasible.
This indefeasibility requirement implies more than mere stability. A would-be knower could achieve stability 
simply by never reflecting on reasons for doubt. Referring to such a person, Descartes points out that 
although a reason for “doubt may not occur to him, it can still crop up if someone else raises the point or if  he 
looks into the matter him self’ (Replies 2, AT 7:141).
Many readers conclude that Descartes' standards of justification are too high, for they have the consequence 
that almost nothing we ordinarily count as knowledge measures up. Before jumping to this conclusion, we 
should put the indefeasibility requirement into context.
Descartes is a contextualist in the sense that he allows that different standards of justification are appropriate 
to different contexts. This is not merely to say the obvious: that depending on the context of inquiry, 
knowledge-worthy justification will sometimes be needed, but other times not. It's to say something stronger: 
that depending on the context of inquiry, the standards of knowledge-worthy justification might vary. For 
example, a contextualist might accept that ‘knowledge’-talk is equally appropriate whether one is describing 
the best achievements of empirical science, or the best achievements of mathematics, while acknowledging 
that the former rest on weaker standards of proof than the latter. This example is potentially misleading, in 
that Descartes appears loath to count mere empirical evidence as knowledge-worthy justification. But upon 
ramping up the standard to what he finds minimally acceptable, the standard admits of context dependent 
variation.
Descartes' minimum standard targets the level of certainty arising when the mind's perception is both clear 
and distinct. (For Descartes, clarity contrasts with obscurity, and distinctness contrasts with confusion.) He 
allows that judgments grounded in clear and distinct perception are defeasible (at least, for those who've not 
yet read the Meditations). But he regularly characterizes defeasible judgments at this level of certainty using 
terminology (e.g., ‘cognitio’ and its cognates) that translates well into the English ‘knowledge’ (and its 
cognates).
In the context of inquiry at play in the Meditations, Descartes insists on indefeasibility. (Typically, he 
reserves the term ‘scientia’ for this brand of knowledge, though he uses ‘cognitio' and its cognates for either 
context.) Descartes' aim is, once and for all, to lay a lasting foundation for knowledge. To achieve this, he 
contends that we “cannot possibly go too far in [our] distrustful attitude” (Med. 1, AT 7:22). Better to have a 
standard that excludes some truths, than one that justifies some falsehoods.
An interesting thesis emerges— call it the ‘No Atheistic Knowledge Thesis’. Descartes maintains that though 
atheists are quite capable of impressive knowledge they are incapable of the indefeasible brand of knowledge 
he seeks:
The fact that an atheist can be “clearly aware [dare cognoscere] that the three angles of a 
triangle are equal to two right angles” is something I do not dispute. But I maintain that this 
awareness [cognitionem\ of his is not true knowledge [scientiam\, since no act of awareness 
[cognitio] that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge [scientia]. Now since 
we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, he cannot be certain that he is not being 
deceived on matters which seem to him to be very evident (as I fully explained). (Replies 2, AT 
7:141)
Hereafter, I refer to the indefeasible brand of knowledge Descartes seeks as ‘Knowledge’ (uppercase ‘K’).
1.4 Methodist Approach
How is the would-be Knower to proceed in identifying candidates for Knowledge? Distinguish particularist
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and methodist responses to the question. The particularist is apt to trust our prima facie intuitions regarding 
particular knowledge claims. These intuitions may then be used to help identify more general epistemic 
principles. The methodist, in contrast, is apt to distrust our prima facie intuitions. The preference is to begin 
with general principles about proper method. The methodical principles may then be used to arrive at settled, 
reflective judgments concerning particular knowledge claims.
Famously, Descartes is in the methodist camp. Those who haphazardly “direct their minds down untrodden 
paths” are sometimes “lucky enough in their wanderings to hit upon some truth,” but “it is far better,” writes 
Descartes, “never to contemplate investigating the truth about any matter than to do so without a method” 
(Rules 4, AT 10:371). Though it's prima facie palpable that the earth is unmoved, and that ordinary objects 
(as tables and chairs) are just as just as they seem, the newly emerging mechanist doctrines of the 17th 
century imply that such judgments are false. These kinds of cases underscore the unreliability of our prima 
facie intuitions and the need for a method by which to distinguish truth and falsity.
Descartes' view is not that all our pre-refleetive intuitions are mistaken. He concedes that “no sane person has 
ever seriously doubted” such particular claims as “that there really is a world, and that human beings have 
bodies” (Synopsis, AT 7:16). His view is that pre-refleetive judgments are likely to be ill-grounded, even 
when true.
The dialectic of the First Meditation features a confrontation between particularism and methodism, with 
methodism emerging the victor. For example, the meditator (while voicing empiricist sensibilities) puts 
forward, as candidates for the foundations of Knowledge, such prima facie obvious claims as “that I am here, 
sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so 
on”—particular matters “about which doubt is quite impossible,” or so it would seem (AT 7:18). In response 
(and at each level of the dialectic), Descartes invokes his own methodical principles to show that the prima 
facie obviousness of such particular claims is insufficient to meet the burden of proof.
1.5 Innate Ideas
Descartes' commitment to innate ideas places him in a rationalist tradition tracing back to Plato. Knowledge 
of the nature of reality derives from ideas of the intellect, not the senses. An important part of metaphysical 
inquiry therefore involves learning to think with the intellect. The allegory of the cave portrays this rationalist 
theme in terms of epistemieally distinct worlds. Plato likens what the senses reveal to shadowy imagery on 
the wall of a poorly lit cave— to wit, images of mere figurine beings; he likens what the intellect reveals to a 
world of fully real beings illuminated by bright sunshine. The metaphor aptly depicts our epistemic 
predicament, on Descartes' own doctrines. An important function of his methods is to help would-be 
Knowers redirect their attention from the confused imagery of the senses, to the luminous world of the 
intellect's clear and distinct ideas.
Further comparisons arise with Plato's doctrine of recollection. The Fifth Meditation meditator 
remarks— having applied Cartesian methodology, thereby discovering innate truths within: “on first 
discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as remembering what I knew 
before” (Med. 5, AT 7:64). Elsewhere Descartes adds, of innate truths:
[W]e come to know them by the power of our own native intelligence, without any sensory 
experience. All geometrical truths are of this sort—not just the most obvious ones, but all the 
others, however abstruse they may appear. Hence, according to Plato, Socrates asks a slave boy 
about the elements of geometry and thereby makes the boy able to dig out certain truths from his 
own mind which he had not previously recognized were there, thus attempting to establish the 
doctrine of reminiscence. Our knowledge of God is of this sort. (1643 letter, AT 8b: 166-67)
The famous wax thought experiment of the Second Meditation is supposed to illustrate (among other things)
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a procedure whereby to “dig out” what is innate. The thought experiment purports to help the meditator 
achieve a “purely mental scrutiny,” more easily apprehending the innate idea of body. (Med. 2, AT 7:30-31) 
According to Descartes, our minds come stocked with a variety of intellectual concepts— ideas whose 
content derives solely from the nature of the mind. This storehouse includes ideas in mathematics (e.g., 
number, line, triangle), logic (e.g., contradiction, necessity), and metaphysics (e.g., identity, substance, 
causality). Interestingly, Descartes holds that even our sensory ideas involve innate content. On his 
understanding of the new mechanical physics, bodies have no real properties resembling our sensory ideas of 
colors, sounds, tastes, and the like, thus implying that the content of such ideas draws from the mind itself. 
Unlike purely intellectual concepts, however, the formation of these sensory ideas depends on sensory 
stimulation. I suggest that on Descartes' official doctrine, ideas are innate insofar as their content derives 
from the nature of the mind alone, as opposed to deriving from sense experience. This characterization allows 
that both intellectual and sensory concepts draw on native resources, though not to the same extent.
Though the subject of rationalism in Descartes' epistemology deserves careful attention, the present essay 
generally focuses on Descartes' efforts to achieve indefeasible Knowledge. Relatively little attention is given 
to his interesting doctrines of innateness, or, more generally, his ontology of thought.
Further reading: On the intemalism-extemalism distinction, see Alston (1989) and Plantinga (1993). For a 
partly externalist interpretation of Descartes, see Della Rocca (2005). For coherentist interpretations of 
Descartes' project, see Frankfurt (1970) and Sosa (1997a). For a stability interpretation of Descartes, see 
Bennett (1990). On the indefeasibility of Knowledge, see Newman and Nelson (1999). On contextualism in 
Descartes, see Newman (2004). On the methodism-particularism distinction, see Chisholm (1982). On 
Descartes' rationalism, see Adams (1975), Jolley (1990), and Newman (forthcoming).
2. Methods: Foundationalism and Doubt
O f his own methodology, Descartes writes:
Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect. When 
an architect wants to build a house which is stable on ground where there is a sandy topsoil over 
underlying rock, or clay, or some other firm base, he begins by digging out a set of trenches from 
which he removes the sand, and anything resting on or mixed in with the sand, so that he can lay 
his foundations on firm soil. In the same way, I began by taking everything that was doubtful and 
throwing it out, like sand ... (Replies 7, AT 7:537)
The theory whereby justified beliefs are best structured on an analogy to architecture traces back to ancient 
Greek thought—to Aristotle, and to work in geometry. That Descartes' method effectively pays homage to 
Aristotle is, of course, welcome by his Aristotelian audience. However, he views Aristotle's foundationalist 
principles as incomplete, at least when applied to metaphysical inquiry. I suggest that his method of doubt is 
intended to complement foundationalism. The two methods are supposed to work in cooperation, as 
conveyed in the above quotation. Let's consider each method.
2.1 Foundationalism
The central insight of foundationalism is to organize one's beliefs in the manner of a well structured, 
architectural edifice. Such an edifice owes its structural integrity to two kinds of features: a firm foundation 
and a superstructure of support beams firmly anchored to the foundation. A system of justified beliefs might 
be organized by two analogous features: a foundation of unshakable first principles, and a superstructure of 
further propositions anchored to the foundation via unshakable inference.
Exemplary of a foundationalist system is Euclid's geometry. Euclid begins with a foundation of first
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principles— definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions— on which he then bases a superstructure 
of further propositions. Descartes' own designs for metaphysical Knowledge are inspired by Euclid's system:
Those long chains composed of very simple and easy reasoning, which geometers customarily 
use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, had given me occasion to suppose that all the 
things which can fall under human knowledge are interconnected in the same way. (.Discourse 2,
AT 6:19).
It would be misleading to characterize the arguments of the Meditations as unfolding straightforwardly 
according to geometric method. But Descartes maintains that they can be reconstructed as such, and he 
expressly does so at the end of the Second Replies—providing a “geometrical” exposition of his central 
constructive steps, under the following headings: definitions, postulates, axioms or common notions, and 
propositions (AT 7:160ff).
As alluded to above, the Meditations contains a destructive component that Descartes likens to the architect's 
preparations for laying a foundation. Though the component finds no analogue in the method of the 
geometers, Descartes appears to hold that this component is needed in metaphysical inquiry. The discovery 
of Euclid's first principles (some of them, at any rate) is comparatively unproblematic: such principles as that 
things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another (one of Euclid's axioms) accord not 
only with reason, but with the senses. In contrast, metaphysical inquiry might have first principles that 
conflict with the senses:
The difference is that the primary notions which are presupposed for the demonstration of 
geometrical truths are readily accepted by anyone, since they accord with the use of our senses.
Hence there is no difficulty there, except in the proper deduction of the consequences, which can 
be done even by the less attentive, provided they remember what has gone before. ... In 
metaphysics by contrast there is nothing which causes so much effort as making our perception 
of the primary notions clear and distinct. Admittedly, they are by their nature as evident as, or 
even more evident than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict with 
many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holding 
from our earliest years, and so only those who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw 
their minds from corporeal things, so far as possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them.
(Replies 2, AT 7:156-57)
Among Descartes' persistent themes is that such preconceived opinions can have the effect of obscuring our 
mental vision of innate principles; that where there are disputes about first principles, it is not “because one 
man's faculty of knowledge extends more widely than another's, but because the common notions are in 
conflict with the preconceived opinions of some people who, as a result, cannot easily grasp them”; whereas, 
“we cannot fail to know them [innate common notions] when the occasion for thinking about them arises, 
provided that we are not blinded by preconceived opinions” (Prin. 1:49-50, AT 8a:24). These “preconceived 
opinions” must be “set aside,” says Descartes, “in order to lay the first foundations of philosophy” (1643 
letter, AT 8b:37). Unless they are set aside, we're apt to regard, as first principles, the mistaken (though 
prima facie obvious) sensory claims that particularists find attractive. And mistakes in the laying of 
foundations weaken the entire edifice. Descartes adds:
All the mistakes made in the sciences happen, in my view, simply because at the beginning we 
make judgements too hastily, and accept as our first principles matters which are obscure and of 
which we do not have a clear and distinct notion. (Search, AT 10:526)
Though foundationalism brilliantly allows for the expansion of knowledge from first principles, Descartes 
thinks that a complementary method is needed to help us discover genuine first principles. He devises the 
method of doubt for this purpose— a method to help “set aside” preconceived opinions.
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2.2 Method of Doubt
Descartes opens the First Meditation asserting the need “to demolish everything completely and start again 
right from the foundations” (AT 7:17). In the architectural analogy, we can think of bulldozers as the ground 
clearing tools of demolition. For Knowledge building, Descartes construes sceptical doubts as the ground 
clearing tools of epistemic demolition. Bulldozers undermine literal ground; doubt undermines epistemic 
grounds.
Descartes' ultimate aims, however, are constructive. Unlike “the sceptics, who doubt only for the sake of 
doubting,” Descartes aims “to reach certainty—to cast aside the loose earth and sand so as to come upon rock 
or clay” (Discourse 3, AT 6:28-29). Bulldozers are typically used for destructive ends, as are sceptical 
doubts. Descartes' methodical innovation is to employ demolition for constructive ends. Where a bulldozer's 
force overpowers the ground, its effects are destructive. Where the ground's firmness resists the bulldozer's 
force, the bulldozer might be used constructively— using it to reveal the ground as firm. Descartes' 
innovation is to use epistemic bulldozers in this way, using sceptical doubts to test the firmness of beliefs put 
forward as candidates for the foundations of Knowledge—testing their epistemic shakability.
According to at least one prominent critic, this employment of sceptical doubt is unnecessary and excessive. 
Writes Gassendi:
There is just one point 1 am not clear about, namely why you did not make a simple and brief 
statement to the effect that you were regarding your previous knowledge as uncertain so that you 
could later single out what you found to be true. Why instead did you consider everything as 
false, which seems more like adopting a new prejudice than relinquishing an old one? This 
strategy made it necessary for you to convince yourself by imagining a deceiving God or some 
evil demon who tricks us, whereas it would surely have been sufficient to cite the darkness of the 
human mind or the weakness of our nature. (Objs. 5, AT 7:257-58; my italics)
Gassendi singles out two features of methodic doubt— its universal and hyperbolic character. In reply, 
Descartes remarks:
You say that you approve of my project for freeing my mind from preconceived opinions; and 
indeed no one can pretend that such a project should not be approved of. But you would have 
preferred me to have carried it out by making a ‘simple and brief statement’—that is, only in a 
perfunctory fashion. Is it really so easy to free ourselves from all the errors which we have 
soaked up since our infancy? Can we really be too careful in carrying out a project which 
everyone agrees should be performed? (Replies 5, AT 7:348)
Evidently, Descartes holds that the universal and hyperbolic character of methodic doubt is helpful to its 
success. Further appeal to the architectural analogy helps elucidate why. Incorporating these features enables 
the method to more effectively identify first principles. Making doubt universal and hyperbolic helps to 
distinguish genuine unshakability from the mere appearance of it.
Consider first the universal character of methodic doubt. In urging a universal doubt, Descartes does not 
mean simply that we're to apply doubt to all candidates for Knowledge. He is urging something much 
stronger. He means that in the initial demolition phase of the project we're to apply doubt collectively, 
undermining the candidates for the foundations of Knowledge all in one go: it is necessary “to demolish 
everything completely and start again right from the foundations” (Med. 1, AT 7:17). Why must doubt be 
universal to this extent? Descartes offers the following analogy:
Suppose [a person] had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the apples were 
rotten, wanted to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading. How would he proceed?
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Would he not begin by tipping the whole lot out of the basket? And would not the next step be to 
cast his eye over each apple in turn, and pick up and put back in the basket only those he saw to 
be sound, leaving the others? In just the same way, those who have never philosophized 
correctly have various opinions in their minds which they have begun to store up since 
childhood, and which they therefore have reason to believe may in many cases be false. They 
then attempt to separate the false beliefs from the others, so as to prevent their contaminating the 
rest and making the whole lot uncertain. Now the best way they can accomplish this is to reject 
all their beliefs together in one go, as if  they were all uncertain and false. They can then go over 
each belief in turn and re-adopt only those which they recognize to be true and indubitable.
(Replies 7, AT 7:481)
Because one bad apple can spoil the whole bunch, the only sure means to a rot-free basket is to discard the 
whole lot. What Descartes notices is that even one falsehood that is mistakenly regarded as a genuine first 
principle— say, the belief that the senses are reliable, or that ancient authorities should be trusted—threatens 
to spread falsehood to other beliefs in the system. A collective doubt helps avoid such mistakes. It ensures 
that the method only approves candidate first principles that are unshakable in their own right: it ensures that 
the appearance of unshakability in a candidate is not owed to its logical relations to other principles, 
themselves not subjected to collective doubt.
How is the hyperbolic character of methodic doubt supposed to contribute to the method's success? The 
architectural analogy is again helpful. Suppose that an architect is vigilant in employing a universal/collective 
demolition in the destructive phase of her project. Suppose, further, that she attempts to use bulldozers for 
constructive purposes. A problem nonetheless arises. How big a bulldozer is she to use? A light-duty 
bulldozer might be unable to distinguish a medium-sized boulder, and immovable bedrock. In both cases, the 
ground would appear immovable. The solution lies in using not light-duty, but heavy-duty tools of 
demolition—the bigger the bulldozer, the better. The lesson is clear for the epistemic builder: the bigger the 
bulldozer, the better translates to the more hyperbolic the doubt, the better.
A potential problem remains. Does not the problem of the “light-duty bulldozer” repeat itself? No matter how 
firm one's ground, it would be dislodged in the face of a yet bigger bulldozer. This raises the worry that there 
might not be unshakable ground, but only yet unshaken ground. Descartes' goal of utterly indubitaWe 
epistemic ground may simply be elusive.
Perhaps the architectural analogy breaks down in a manner that serves Descartes well. For though there is no 
wasv-powerful literal bulldozer, perhaps epistemic bulldozing is not subject to this limitation. Descartes 
seems to think that there is a wo^-powerful doubt—a doubt than which none more hyperbolic can be 
conceived. The Evil Genius Doubt (and equivalent doubts) is supposed to fit the bill. If  the method reveals 
epistemic ground that stands fast in the face of a doubt this hyperbolic, then, as Descartes seems to hold, this 
counts as epistemic bedrock if anything does.
Hence the importance of the universal and hyperbolic character of the method of doubt. Gassendi's 
suggestion that we forego methodic doubt in favor of a “simple and brief statement to the effect that [we're] 
regarding [our] previous knowledge as uncertain” misses the intended point of methodic doubt.
Before turning attention to the First Meditation demolition project, I want to address what I believe are 
significant misconceptions about the method of doubt. Two of these are suggested in a passage from the 
pragmatist Peirce:
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually 
have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a 
maxim [viz., the maxim that the philosopher “must begin with universal doubt”], for they are 
things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a
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mere self-deception, and not real doub t... A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, 
find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a 
positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in 
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. (1955, 228f)
It is a misconception that universal doubt is intended to result from the mere effort to adhere to the 
maxim— as if by sheer effort of will. To the contrary, Descartes introduces sceptical arguments precisely in 
acknowledgement that we need reasons for doubt:
1 did say that there was some difficulty in expelling from our belief everything we have 
previously accepted. One reason for this is that before we can decide to doubt, we need some 
reason for doubting; and that is why in my First Meditation 1 put forward the principal reasons 
for doubt. (Replies 5, appendix, AT 9a:204)
Another misconception is suggested by Peirce's reference to a “doubt in our hearts.” Distinguish two kinds of 
doubt, in terms of two kinds of ways that doubt can defeat knowledge. Some doubts purport to undermine 
one's conviction or belief—call these "belief-defeating doubts’. Other doubts purport to undermine one's 
justification (whether or not they undermine belief)— call these 1 justification-defeating doubts’. Descartes' 
aim of indefeasible Knowledge requires that he overcome both kinds of doubt, since either one defeats 
Knowledge. But the two kinds of doubt invoke quite different doxastic attitudes. What Peirce calls a “doubt 
in our hearts” is suggestive of a belief-defeating doubt. Descartes' hyperbolic doubts, however, are intended 
as justification-defeating. Part of what makes his doubts hyperbolic is that their extravagance renders them 
unlikely to dislodge our existing beliefs. His doubts are supposed to help us to appreciate that even though 
we believe that 2+3=5, and believe that we're awake, and believe that there is an external world, we 
nonetheless lack indefeasible justification.
A related misconception has Descartes calling not merely for doubt, but for disbelief or dissent. For example, 
Gassendi takes Descartes to be urging us, quite literally, to “consider everything as false” (Objs. 5, AT 
7:257-58). Thus read, Descartes is calling for something even stronger than a belief-defeating doubt; he's 
calling for a disbelief-inducing doubt. But surely the spirit (even if  not always the letter) of Descartes' 
invocation to doubt is that we are to “hold back [our] assent from opinions which are not completely certain 
and indubitable just as carefully as [we] do from those which are patently false” (Med. 1, AT 7:18).
Finally, a common misconception has it that the universality of doubt renders inert the doubting 
hypotheses— and thus the entire method— since the hypotheses themselves are dubious in every case. But 
this misses the point of the method: namely, to extend doubt universally to candidates for Knowledge, but not 
also to the very tools for founding Knowledge. As Descartes concedes: “there may be reasons which are 
strong enough to compel us to doubt, even though these reasons are themselves doubtful, and hence are not to 
be retained later on” (Replies 7, AT 7:473-74).
Further reading: On foundationalism: for Descartes' treatment, see Discourse, First Meditation, and Seventh 
Objections and Replies; for its treatment by ancients, see Euclid (1956) and Aristotle (Posterior Analytics)', 
by interpreters of Descartes, see Sosa (1997a) and Van Cleve (1979). On Cartesian inference, see Gaukroger 
(1989) and Hacking (1980). On methodical doubt: for Descartes' treatment, see Rules, Discourse, First 
Meditation, and Seventh Replies; by commentators, see Frankfurt (1970), Garber (1986), Newman 
(forthcoming), Williams (1983), and Wilson (1978). On the analysis-synthesis distinction (closed related to 
issues of doubt and methodology): see the Second Replies (AT 7:155ff); see also Galileo (1967, 50f),
Amauld (L'Art de Penser, 4.2-3), Curley (1986), and Hintikka (1978).
3. First Meditation Doubting Arguments
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3.1 Dreaming Doubt
Historically, there are two distinct dream-related skeptical doubts. The one doubt undermines the judgment 
that one is presently awake— call this the ‘Now Dreaming Doubt’, The other doubt undermines the judgment 
that one is ever awake (i.e., in the way normally supposed)— call this the ‘Always Dreaming Doubt’, A 
textual case can be made on behalf of both formulations being raised in the Meditations. Though it will not 
be my aim to make this textual case, we will consider both formulations.
Both kinds of dream doubt appeal to some version of the thesis that the experiences we take as dreams are (at 
their best) qualitatively similar to what we take as waking— call this the ‘Similarity Thesis’, The Similarity 
Thesis may be formulated in a variety of strengths, A strong Similarity Thesis might contend that some 
dreams are phenomenally indistinguishable from waking, even subsequent to waking-up; a weaker thesis 
might contend merely that dreams seem similar to waking while having them, but not upon waking. Debates 
about precisely how similar waking and dreaming can be, have raged for more than two millennia. The tone 
of the debates suggests that the degree of qualitative similarity may vary across individuals (or, at least, 
across their recollections of dreams). Granting such variation, dreaming doubts that depend on weaker 
versions of the Similarity Theses are (other things equal) apt to be more persuasive, I want to consider a 
textually defensible formulation that is relatively weak, (Note, however, that some texts suggest a strong 
thesis: “As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while 
asleep” (Med. 1, AT 7:19, my italics),)
The relatively weak thesis I have in mind is this: that the similarity we take to hold between waking and 
dreaming is sufficient to render it thinkable that a dream would seem realistic, even when reflecting on it. As 
Descartes writes: “every sensory experience I have ever thought I was having while awake I can also think of 
myself as sometimes having while asleep” (Med. 6, AT 7:77). This version of the Similarity Thesis is 
endorsable by those who never recollect dreams that seem (on hindsight) phenomenally indistinguishable 
from waking; indeed, it's endorsable even by those who simply do not remember their dreams to any 
significant degree.
This weak Similarity Thesis is sufficient to generate straightaway the Now Dreaming Doubt, Since it is 
thinkable that a dream would convincingly seem as realistic (while having it) as my present experience 
seems, then, for all I Know, I am now dreaming. Recall that Descartes' method requires only a 
justification-defeating doubt, not a belief-defeating doubt. The doubt does its damage as long as I find it 
thinkable that a dream would seem this good. Descartes concedes that I might believe that I am awake—to 
wit, my belief might be true. Descartes is only denying that I have indubitable certainty: “there are never any 
sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep” (Med. 1, AT 7:19).
The conclusion that I do not Know that I am now awake has widespread sceptical consequences. For if  I do 
not Know this, then neither do I Know that I am now “holding this piece of paper in my hands”—nor do I 
Know anything suggested by external sensation. For all I Know, the apparent sensible objects around me are 
players in a vivid dream.
Much to-do has been made about whether dreaming arguments are self-refuting. According to an influential 
objection, Similarity Theses presuppose that we can reliably distinguish dreams and waking, yet the 
conclusion of dreaming arguments presupposes that we cannot. Therefore, if  the conclusion of such 
arguments is true, then the Similarity Thesis cannot be. By way of reply, some formulations of the thesis do 
make this mistake. Of present interest is whether all do— specifically, whether Descartes makes the mistake. 
He does not. Interestingly, his formulation of the Similarity Thesis presupposes only the truism that we do in 
fact distinguish dreaming and waking (never mind whether reliably). He states his version of the thesis in 
terms of what we think of as dreams, versus what we think of as waking: “every sensory experience I have 
ever thought I was having while awake I can also think of myself as sometimes having while asleep” (Med.
11 o f 35 7/12/2006 2:18 PM
Descartes' Epistemology http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/
6, AT 7:77).
Does Descartes also put forward a second dreaming argument, the Always Dreaming Doubt? There is strong 
textual evidence to support this, though I'll not make a textual case here. The conclusion of the Always 
Dreaming Doubt can be generated from the very same Similarity Thesis, together with a further assumption. 
The further assumption is that, for all I Know, the processes producing what I take as waking are no more 
veridical than those producing what I take as dreams. As Descartes writes:
[EJvery sensory experience I have ever thought I was having while awake I can also think of 
myself as sometimes having while asleep; and since I do not believe that what I seem to perceive 
in sleep comes from things located outside me, I did not see why I should be any more inclined 
to believe this of what I think I perceive while awake. (Med. 6, AT 7:77)
The aim of the Always Dreaming Doubt is not to undermine whether I am now awake, but whether my 
sensation is produced by external objects even assuming I am awake. For in the cases of both waking and 
dreaming, my cognitive access extends only to the productive result, but not the productive process. On what 
basis, then, do I conclude that the productive processes are different—that external objects play more of a 
role in waking than in dreaming? For all I Know, both categories of experience are produced by some 
subconscious faculty of my mind. As the meditator says:
[T]here may be some other faculty [of my mind] not yet fully known to me, which produces 
these ideas without any assistance from external things; this is, after all, just how I have always 
thought ideas are produced in me when I am dreaming. (Med. 3, AT 7:39)
The sceptical consequences of the Always Dreaming Doubt are even more devastating than those of the Now 
Dreaming Doubt. If I do not Know that “normal waking” experience is produced by external objects, then, 
for all I Know, all of my experiences might be dreams o f a sort. For all I Know, there might not be an 
external world. For my best evidence of an external world derives from my preconceived opinion that 
external objects produce my sensation:
All these considerations are enough to establish that it is not reliable judgement but merely some 
blind impulse that has made me believe up till now that there exist things distinct from myself 
which transmit to me ideas or images of themselves through the sense organs or in some other 
way. (Med. 3, AT 7:39-40)
The two dreaming doubts are parasitic on the same Similarity Thesis, though their sceptical consequences 
differ. The Now Dreaming Doubt raises the universal possibility o f delusion: for any one of my sensory 
experiences, it is possible (for all I Know) that the experience is delusive. The Always Dreaming Doubt 
raises the possibility o f universal delusion: it is possible (for all I Know) that all my sensory experiences are 
delusions (say, from a God's-eye perspective). In either case, dreaming related doubts are supposed to help 
clarify that external sense, per se, is incapable of grounding Knowledge of external things.
3.2 Evil Genius Doubt
Though dreaming doubts do significant demolition work, they are light-duty bulldozers relative to Descartes' 
most power sceptical doubt. What further judgments are left to be undermined? Immediately following the 
First Meditation discussion of dreaming, the meditator tentatively concludes that dreaming motivated doubts 
undermine the results of empirical disciplines— “physics, astronomy, medicine,” and the like. Whereas:
[Arithmetic, geometry and other subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest and 
most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something 
certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five,
12 o f 35 7/12/2006 2:18 PM
Descartes' Epistemology http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/
and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should 
incur any suspicion of being false. (Med. 1, AT 7:20)
In the final analysis, Descartes holds that such transparent truths— along with demonstrable truths, and many 
judgments of internal sense—are indeed Know able. To become actually Known, however, they must be 
unshakably grounded in the face the most powerful doubts. The stage is thus set for the introduction of this 
most powerful doubt.
The most famous rendering of Descartes' most hyperbolic doubt takes the form of the Evil Genius Doubt. 
Suppose I am the creation of a powerful but malicious being. This “evil genius” (or deceiving “God, or 
whatever I may call him,” AT 7:24) has given me flawed cognitive faculties, such that I am in error even 
about epistemically impressive matters— even the simple matters that seem supremely evident. The 
suggestion is unbelievable, but not unthinkable. It is intended as a justification-defeating doubt that 
undermines our judgments about even the most simple and evident matters.
Many readers of Descartes assume that the Evil Genius Doubt draws its sceptical force from the “utmost 
power” attributed to the deceiver. This is to misunderstand Descartes. He contends that an equally powerful 
doubt may be generated on the opposite supposition—namely, the supposition that I am not the creature of an 
all-powerful being:
Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God rather 
than believe that everything else is uncertain. ... yet since deception and error seem to be 
imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so 
imperfect as to be deceived all the time. (Med. 1, AT 7:21).
Descartes makes essentially the same point in a parallel passage of the Principles:
[W]e have been told that there is an omnipotent God who created us. Now we do not know 
whether he may have wished to make us beings of the sort who are always deceived even in 
those matters which seem to us supremely evident... We may of course suppose that our 
existence derives not from a supremely powerful God but either from ourselves or from some 
other source; but in that case, the less powerful we make the author of our coming into being, the 
more likely it will be that we are so imperfect as to be deceived all the time. (Prin. 1:5, AT 8a:6)
Descartes' official position is that the Evil Genius Doubt is merely one among multiple hypotheses that can 
motivate the more general hyperbolic doubt. Fundamentally, the doubt is about my cognitive nature— about 
the possibility that my mind is flawed. Descartes consistently emphasizes this theme throughout the 
Meditations:
God could have given me a nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most 
evident. (Med. 3, AT 7:36)
I can convince myself that I have a natural disposition to go wrong from time to time in matters 
which I think I perceive as evidently as can be. (Med. 5, AT 7:70)
I saw nothing to rule out the possibility that my natural constitution made me prone to error even 
in matters which seemed to me most true. (Med. 6, AT 7:77)
What underwrites the doubt is not a specific story about how I got my cognitive wiring; it's the 
realization—regardless the story—that I can worry that my cognitive wiring is flawed. Elsewhere, I have 
suggested that we name the underlying doubt ‘Meta-Cognitive Doubt’, to make clear that it is fundamentally 
about the implications of having a flawed cognitive nature, not the implications of an omnipotent creator. 
Even so, I shall regularly speak in terms of the evil genius (following Descartes' lead), as a kind of mnemonic
13 o f 35 7/12/2006 2:18 PM
D escartes' Epistem ology http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-episternology/
for the more general doubt about our cognitive nature.
Having introduced the Evil Genius Doubt, the First Meditation program of demolition is not only hyperbolic 
but universal. As the meditator remarks, 1 “am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former 
beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised” (Med, 1, AT 7:21), As will emerge, the early 
paragraphs of the Third Meditation clarify a further nuance of the Evil Genius Doubt— a nuance consistently 
observed thereafter, Descartes clarifies there that the Evil Genius Doubt operates in an indirect manner, a 
topic to which we return (in Section 5,1),
Further reading: On Descartes' sceptical arguments, see Bouwsma (1949), Curley (1978), Newman (1994), 
Newman and Nelson (1999), Williams (1986 and 1995), For a contrary reading of the Evil Genius Doubt, see 
Gewirth (1941) and Wilson (1978). For a more general philosophical treatment of dreaming arguments, see 
Dunlap (1977).
4. Cogito Ergo Sum
4.1 The First Item of Knowledge
Famously, Descartes puts forward a very simple candidate as the “first item of knowledge.” The candidate is 
suggested by methodic doubt—by the very effort at thinking all my thoughts might be mistaken. Early in the 
Second Meditation, Descartes has his meditator observe:
1 have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, 
no bodies. Does it now follow that 1 too do not exist? No: if 1 convinced myself of something 
then 1 certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is 
deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case 1 too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving 
me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that 1 am nothing so 
long as 1 think that 1 am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, 1 must 
finally conclude that this proposition, I  am, I  exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward 
by me or conceived in my mind. (Med. 2, AT 7:25)
As the canonical formulation has it, I  think therefore I  am (Latin: cogito ergo sum\ French: jepense, done je  
suis)— a formulation which does not expressly arise in the Meditations.
Descartes regards the ‘cogito’ (as 1 shall refer to it) as the “first and most certain of all to occur to anyone 
who philosophizes in an orderly way” (Prin. 1:7, AT 8a:7). Testing the cogito with methodic doubt is 
supposed to help me appreciate its certainty. For the existence of my body is subject to doubts that the 
existence of my thinking resist. Indeed, the very attempt at thinking away my thinking is self-stultifying.
The cogito raises numerous philosophical questions and has generated an enormous literature. In summary 
fashion, I'll try to clarify a few central points.
First, a first-person formulation is essential to the certainty of the cogito. Third-person claims, such as “Icarus 
thinks,” or “Descartes thinks,” are not unshakably certain— not for me, at any rate; only the occurrence of my 
thought has a chance of resisting hyperbolic doubt. There are a number of passages in which Descartes refers 
to a third-person version of the cogito. But none of these occurs in the context of trying to establish 
categorically the existence of a particular thinker (as opposed merely to the conditional existence of whatever 
thinks).
Second, a present tense formulation is essential to the certainty of the cogito. It's no good to reason that “1 
existed since 1 recall 1 was thinking,” because methodic doubt calls into question whether I'm having
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veridical memories. (Maybe I'm merely dreaming that 1 was thinking, or maybe an evil genius is feeding me 
false memories.) Nor does it work to reason that “1 shall continue to exist since 1 am now thinking.” As the 
meditator remarks, “it could be that were 1 totally to cease from thinking, 1 should totally cease to exist”
(Med. 2, AT 7:27). The privileged certainty of the cogito is grounded in the “manifest contradiction” (cf. AT 
7:36) of thinking away my oeeurrent thinking.
Third, the certainty of the cogito depends on being formulated in terms of my cogitatio— i.e., my thinking, or 
awareness/consciousness more generally. Any mode of my thinking is sufficient: doubt, understanding, 
affirmation, denial, volition, imagination, sensation, or the like (cf. Med. 2, AT 7:28). My non-thinking 
activities, on the other hand, are insufficient. For instance, it's no good to reason that “1 exist since 1 am 
walking,” because methodic doubt calls into question the existence of my legs. (Maybe I'm just dreaming that
1 have legs.) A simple revision, such as “1 exist since it seems I'm walking,” restores the anti-sceptical 
potency (cf. Replies 5, AT 7:352; Prin. 1:9).
A caveat is in order. That Descartes rejects the certainty of formulations presupposing the existence of a body 
commits him to nothing more than an epistemological distinction between mind and body, but not yet an 
ontological distinction (as in substance dualism). Indeed, in the passage following the cogito, Descartes has 
his meditator say:
And yet may it not perhaps be the case that these very things which 1 am supposing to be nothing 
[e.g., “that structure of limbs which is called a human body”], because they are unknown to me, 
are in reality identical with the “1” of which 1 am aware? 1 do not know, and for the moment 1 
shall not argue the point, since 1 can make judgements only about things which are known to me.
(Med. 2, AT 7:27)
Fourth, and related to the foregoing quotation, is that Descartes' reference to an “1”, in the “1 think”, is not 
intended to presuppose the existence of a substantial self. Indeed, in the very next sentence following the 
initial statement of the cogito, the meditator says: “But 1 do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what 
this T  is, that now necessarily exists” (Med. 2, AT 7:25). The cogito purports to yield certainty that 1 exist 
insofar as 1 am a thinking thing, whatever that turns out to be. The ensuing discussion is intended to help 
arrive at an understanding of the ontological nature of the thinking subject.
More generally, one should keep distinct issues of epistemic and ontological dependence. In the final 
analysis, Descartes thinks he shows that the occurrence of my thought depends (ontologieally) on the 
existence of a substantial self—to wit, on the existence of an infinite substance, namely God (cf. Med. 3, AT 
7:48ff). But Descartes denies that an acceptance of these ontological matters is epistemieally prior to the 
cogito: its privileged certainty is not supposed to depend (epistemieally) on abstruse metaphysics.
Granting that the cogito does not presuppose a substantial self, what then is the epistemic basis for injecting 
the “1” into the “1 think”? Many critics have complained that, in referring to the “1”, Descartes begs the 
question—that he presupposes what is supposedly established in the “1 exist.” Among the critics, Bertrand 
Russell objects that “the word T  is really illegitimate”; that Descartes should have, instead, stated “his 
ultimate premiss in the form ‘there are thoughts’.” Russell adds that “the word T  is grammatically 
convenient, but does not describe a datum.” (1945, 567) Accordingly, “there is pain” and “1 am in pain” have 
different contents, and Descartes is entitled only to the former.
One effort at reply has it that introspection reveals more than what Russell allows— it reveals the subjective 
character of experience. On this view, there is more to the phenomenal story of being in pain than is 
expressed by saying that there is pain: in the former case, there is pain plus a point-ofview— a phenomenal 
surplus that's difficult to characterize except by adding that “1” am in pain, that the pain is mine. Importantly, 
my awareness of this subjective feature of experience does not depend on an awareness of the metaphysical 
nature of a thinking subject. If we take Descartes to be using ‘1’ to signify this subjective character, then he is
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not smuggling in something that's not already there: the ‘T ’-ness of consciousness turns out to be (contra 
Russell) a primary datum of experience. And though, as Hume persuasively argues, introspection reveals no 
sense impressions suited to the role of a thinking subject, Descartes, unlike Hume, feels no pressure to reduce 
all of our concepts to sense impressions. Descartes' idea of the self does ultimately draw on innate conceptual 
resources.
Fifth, much of the debate over whether the cogito involves inference, or is instead a simple intuition (roughly, 
self-evident), is preempted by three observations. One observation concerns the absence of an express ‘ergo’ 
(‘therefore’) in the Second Meditation account. It seems a mistake to emphasize this absence, as if suggesting 
that Descartes denies any role for inference. For the Second Meditation passage is the one place (of his 
various published treatments ) where Descartes explicitly details a line of inferential reflection leading up to 
the conclusion that I am, I exist. His other treatments merely say the ‘therefore1; the Meditations treatment 
unpacks it. A second observation is that it seems a mistake to assume that the cogito must either involve 
inference, or intuition, but not both. There is no inconsistency in the view that the meditator comes to 
appreciate the persuasive force of the cogito by means of inferential reflection, while also holding that his 
eventual conviction is not grounded in inference. A third observation is that what one intuits might well 
include an inference: it is widely held among philosophers today that modusponens is self-evident, and yet it 
contains an inference. There is no inconsistency in claiming a self-evident grasp of a proposition with 
inferential structure— a fact applicable to the cogito. As Descartes writes:
When someone says “1 am thinking, therefore 1 am, or 1 exist,” he does not deduce existence
from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple
intuition of the mind. (Replies 2, AT 7:140)
4.2 But is it iCnowledge?
There are interpretive disputes about whether the cogito is supposed to count as indefeasible Knowledge. 
(That is, about whether it thus counts upon its initial introduction, prior to the arguments for a non-deceiving 
God.) Many commentators hold that it is supposed to count as indefeasible Knowledge. But the case for this 
interpretation is by no means clear.
There is no disputing that Descartes characterizes the cogito as the “first item of knowledge [cognitione]” 
(Med. 3, AT 7:35); as the first “piece of knowledge [cognitio]” (Prin. 1:194, AT 8a:7). Noteworthy, however, 
is the Latin terminology (‘cognitio’ and its cognates) that Descartes uses in these characterizations. As 
discussed in Section 1.3, Descartes is a contextualist in the sense that he uses ‘knowledge’ language in two 
different contexts of clear and distinct judgments: the less rigorous context includes defeasible judgments, as 
in the case of the atheist geometer (who can't block hyperbolic doubt); the more rigorous context requires 
indefeasible judgments, as with the brand of Knowledge sought after in the Meditations.
Worthy of attention is that Descartes characterizes the cogito using the same cognitive language that he uses 
to characterize the atheist's defeasible cognition. Recall that Descartes writes of the atheist's clear and distinct 
grasp of geometry: “1 maintain that this awareness [cognitionem] of his is not true knowledge [scien/iam]" 
(Replies 2, AT 7:141). This alone does not prove that the cogito is supposed to be defeasible. It does, 
however, prove that calling it the “first item of knowledge” doesn't entail that Descartes intends it as 
indefeasible Knowledge.
Bearing further on whether the cogito counts as indefeasible Knowledge—available even to the atheist— is 
the No Atheistic Knowledge Thesis (cf. Section 1.3 above). Descartes makes repeated and unequivocal 
statements implying this thesis. Consider the following texts, each arising in a context of clarifying the 
requirements of indefeasible Knowledge (all italics are mine):
For if 1 do not know this [i.e., whether God is a deceiver], it seems that 1 can never be completely
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certain about anything else. (Med, 3, AT 7:36, trans, altered)
1 see that the certainty of all other things depends on this [knowledge of God], so that without it 
nothing can ever be perfectly known \perfecte sciri]. (Med, 5, AT 7:69)
[]]f 1 did not possess knowledge of God ... 1 should thus never have true and certain knowledge 
[scientiam] about anything, but only shifting and changeable opinions. (Med. 5, AT 7:69)
And upon claiming finally to have achieved indefeasible Knowledge:
Thus 1 see plainly that the certainty and truth of all knowledge [scientiae] depends uniquely on 
my awareness of the true God, to such an extent that 1 was incapable of perfect knowledge 
[perfecte scire] about anything else until 1 became aware of him. (Med. 5, AT 7:71)
These texts make a powerful case that nothing can be indefeasibly Known prior to establishing that we're 
creatures of an all-perfect God, not an evil genius. These texts make no exceptions. Descartes looks to hold 
that hyperbolic doubt is utterly unbounded— that it undermines all manner of judgments.
Other texts can be cited in support of the interpretation of the cogito as indefeasible Knowledge. For 
example, we have seen texts making clear that it resists hyperbolic doubt. Often overlooked, however, is that 
it is only subsequent to the introduction of the cogito that Descartes has his meditator first notice the manner 
in which clear and distinct perception is both resistant and vulnerable to hyperbolic doubt: the extraordinary 
certainty of such perception resists hyperbolic doubt while it is occurring; it is vulnerable to hyperbolic doubt 
upon redirecting one's perceptual attention. This theme is developed more fully in the next Section below.
As will emerge, there are two main kinds of interpretive camps concerning how to deal with the Cartesian 
Circle. The one camp contends that hyperbolic doubt is utterly unbounded. On this view, the No Atheist 
Knowledge Thesis is taken quite literally. The other camp contends that hyperbolic doubt is bounded; that is, 
that the cogito, and a few other special truths, are in a lock box of sorts, utterly protected from even the most 
hyperbolic doubt. This view allows that atheists can have indefeasible Knowledge. These two kinds of 
interpretations are developed in Section 6.
Further reading: For important passages in Descartes' handling of the cogito, see the second and third sets of 
Objections and Replies. In the secondary literature, see Beyssade (1993), Hintikka (1962), and Markie 
(1992). For especially innovative interpretations, see Broughton (2002) and Vinci (1998).
5. Epistemic Privilege and Defeasibility
The extraordinary certainty and doubt-resistance of the cogito marks an Archimedean turning point in the 
meditator's inquiry. Descartes builds on its impressiveness to help clarify further epistemic theses. The 
present Section considers two such theses about our epistemically privileged perceptions. First, that clarity 
and distinctness are, jointly, the mark of our epistemically best perceptions (notwithstanding that such 
perception remains defeasible). Second, that judgments about one's own mind are epistemically privileged 
compared with those about bodies.
5.1 Our Epistemic Best: Clear and Distinct Perception and its Defeasibility
The opening four paragraphs of the Third Meditation are pivotal. Descartes uses them to codify the 
phenomenal marks of our epistemically best perceptions, while clarifying also that even this impressive 
epistemic ground falls short of the goal of indefeasible Knowledge. This sobering realization is what leads to 
Descartes' infamous efforts to refute the Evil Genius Doubt, by proving a non-deceiving God.
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The first and second paragraphs portray the meditator attempting to build on the success of the cogito by 
identifying a general principle of certainty: “I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also 
know what is required for my being certain about anything?” (AT 7:35). What are the phenomenal marks of 
this impressive perception— what is it like to have perception that good? Descartes' descriptive answer: “In 
this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting” (ibid.).
The third and fourth paragraphs help clarify (among other things) what Descartes takes to be epistemieally 
impressive about clear and distinct perception, though absent from external sense perception. The third 
paragraph has the meditator observing:
Yet I previously accepted as wholly certain and evident many things which I afterwards realized 
were doubtful. What were these? The earth, sky, stars, and everything else that I apprehended 
with the senses. But what was it about them that I perceived clearly? Just that the ideas, or 
thoughts, of such things appeared before my mind. Yet even now I am not denying that these 
ideas occur within me. But there was something else which I used to assert, and which through 
habitual belief I thought I perceived clearly, although I did not in fact do so. This was that there 
were things outside me which were the sources of my ideas and which resembled them in all 
respects. Here was my mistake; or at any rate, if my judgement was true, it was not thanks to the 
strength of my perception. (Med. 3, AT 7:35)
The very next paragraph (the fourth) draws the contrast, emphasizing the impressive certainty of clear and 
distinct perception. As earlier noted (Section 1.1), the certainty of interest to Descartes is psychological in 
character, though not merely psychological. Not only does occurrent clear and distinct perception resist 
doubt, it provides a kind of cognitive illumination. Both of these epistemic virtues— its doubt-resistance, and 
its luminance— are noted in the fourth paragraph:
[Regarding] those matters which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind's eye ... when I turn 
to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I 
spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am 
nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something; or make it true at some future time that I 
have never existed, since it is now true that I exist; or bring it about that two and three added 
together are more or less than five, or anything of this kind in which I see a manifest 
contradiction. (Med. 3, AT 7:36)
The contrast drawn in the third and fourth paragraphs gets at a theme that Descartes thinks crucial to his 
broader project: namely, that there is “a big difference”—an introspectible difference—between external 
sense perception, and perception that is genuinely clear and distinct. The external senses result in, at best, “a 
spontaneous impulse” to believe something, an impulse we're able to resist. In contrast, occurrent clear and 
distinct perception is utterly irresistible: “Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light— for example that 
from the fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on— cannot in any way be open to doubt.” 
(Med. 3, AT 7:38) As Descartes repeatedly conveys: “my nature is such that so long as I perceive something 
very clearly and distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true” (Med. 5, AT 7:69; cf. 3:64, 7:36, 7:65, 8a:9).
Because of the epistemic impressiveness of clarity and distinctness (notably, as exhibited in the cogito), the 
meditator concludes that it will issue as the mark of truth, if anything will. He tentatively formulates the 
following candidate for a truth criterion: “I now seem \videor\ to be able to lay it down as a general rule that 
whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true” (Med. 3, AT 7:35). I shall call this general principle 
the ‘C&D Rule’. The announcement of the candidate criterion is carefully tinged with caution (videor), as the 
C&D Rule has yet to be subjected to hyperbolic doubt. Should it turn out that clarity and distinctness— as 
ground— is shakable, then, there would remain some doubt about the general veracity of clear and distinct 
perception: in that case, the mere fact that a matter was clearly and distinctly perceived “would not be enough 
to make me certain of the truth of the matter” (ibid.). This cautionary note anticipates the sobering realization
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of the fourth paragraph, that, for all its impressiveness, even clear and distinct perception is in some sense 
defeasible.
In what sense defeasible? Recall that the Evil Genius Doubt is, fundamentally, a doubt about our cognitive 
natures. Maybe my mind was made flawed, such that 1 go wrong even when my perception is clear and 
distinct. As the meditator conveys in the fourth paragraph, my creator might have “given me a nature such 
that 1 was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident,” with the consequence that “1 go wrong even 
in those matters which 1 think 1 see utterly clearly with my mind's eye” (AT 7:36). The result is a kind of 
epistemic schizophrenia:
Moments o f epistemic optimism: While 1 am directly attending to a proposition—perceiving it 
clearly and distinctly— 1 enjoy an irresistible cognitive luminance and my assent is compelled.
Moments o f epistemic pessimism: When 1 am no longer directly attending—no longer perceiving 
it clearly and distinctly— 1 can entertain the sceptical hypothesis that the irresistible cognitive 
luminance is epistemieally worthless, being simply a trick played on me by an evil genius.
The doubt is thus indirect, in the sense that these moments of epistemic pessimism arise when 1 am no longer 
directly attending to the propositions in question. This indirect operation of hyperbolic doubt is conveyed not 
only in the fourth paragraph, but in numerous other texts, including the following:
Admittedly my nature is such that so long as 1 perceive something very clearly and distinctly 1 
cannot but believe it to be true. But my nature is also such that 1 cannot fix my mental vision 
continually on the same thing, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; and often the memory of a 
previously made judgement may come back, when 1 am no longer attending to the arguments 
which led me to make it. And so other arguments can now occur to me which might easily 
undermine my opinion, if  1 were unaware of God; and 1 should thus never have true and certain 
knowledge about anything, but only shifting and changeable opinions. For example, when 1 
consider the nature of a triangle, it appears most evident to me, steeped as 1 am in the principles 
of geometry, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and so long as 1 attend to the 
proof, 1 cannot but believe this to be true. But as soon as 1 turn my mind's eye away from the 
proof, then in spite of still remembering that 1 perceived it very clearly, 1 can easily fall into 
doubt about its truth, if 1 am unaware of God.For 1 can convince myself that 1 have a natural 
disposition to go wrong from time to time in matters which 1 think 1 perceive as evidently as can 
be. (Med.5, AT 7:69-70; cf. AT 3:64-65; AT 8a:9-10).
Granted, this indirect doubt is exceedingly hyperbolic. Even so, it means that we lack fully  indefeasible 
Knowledge. Descartes thus closes the fourth paragraph as follows:
And since 1 have no cause to think that there is a deceiving God, and 1 do not yet even know for 
sure whether there is a God at all, any reason for doubt which depends simply on this supposition 
is a very slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one. But in order to remove even this slight reason 
for doubt, as soon as the opportunity arises 1 must examine whether there is a God, and, if  there 
is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if 1 do not know this, it seems that 1 can never be quite 
certain about anything else. (Med. 3, AT 7:36)
(Note: The leading role played by the cogito in this four paragraph passage is easily overlooked. Not only is 
it the exemplar of judging clearly and distinctly (paragraph two), it is listed among the propositions 
(paragraph four) that are eompellingly certain while attended to, though undermined when we no longer thus 
attend.)
What next? How are we to make epistemic progress if even our epistemic best is subject to hyperbolic doubt?
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This juncture o f the Third Meditation (the end o f the fourth paragraph) marks the beginning point of 
Descartes' notorious efforts to refute the Evil Genius Doubt. The efforts involve an attempt to establish that 
we are the creatures not o f an evil genius, but an all-perfect creator who would not allow us to be deceived 
about what we clearly and distinctly perceive. Before turning our attention (in Section 6), to these efforts let's 
digress somewhat to consider a Cartesian doctrine that has received much attention in its subsequent history.
5.2 The Epistemic Privilege of Judgments About the Mind
Descartes holds that judgments about one's own mind are epistemically better off than judgments about 
bodies. In our natural, pre-reflective condition, however, we're apt to confuse the sensory images o f bodies 
with the external things themselves, a confusion leading us to think our judgments about bodies are 
epistemically impressive.The confusion is clearly expressed (Descartes would say) in G. E. Moore's famous 
claim to knowledge— “Here is a hand”— along with his more general defense o f common sense:
1 begin, then, with my list o f truisms, every one o f which (in my own opinion) 1 know, with 
certainty, to be true. ... There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This 
body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since ... But the 
earth had existed also for many years before my body was bom ... (1962, 32-33)
In contrast, Descartes writes:
[l]f 1 judge that the earth exists from the fact that 1 touch it or see it, this very fact undoubtedly 
gives even greater support for the judgem ent that my mind exists. For it may perhaps be the case 
that 1 judge that 1 am touching the earth even though the earth does not exist at all; but it cannot 
be that, when 1 make this judgement, my mind which is making the judgement does not exist.
(.Prin. 1:11, AT 8a:8-9)
Methodical doubt is intended to help us appreciate the folly o f the commonsensical position— helping us to 
recognize that the perception o f our own minds is “not simply prior to and more certain ... but also more 
evident” than that o f our own bodies {Prin. 1:11, AT 8a:8). “Disagreement on this point,” writes Descartes, 
comes from “those who have not done their philosophizing in an orderly way”; from those who, while 
properly acknowledging the “certainty o f their own existence,” mistakenly “take ‘themselves’ to mean only 
their bodies”— failing to “realize that they should have taken ‘themselves’ in this context to mean their minds 
alone” {Prin. 1:12, AT 8a:9).
In epistemological treatments Descartes underwrites the mind-better-known-than-body doctrine with 
methodic doubt. Other reasons motivate him as well. The doctrine is closely allied with his commitment to a 
representational theory o f sense perception. On his view o f sense perception, our sense organs and nerves 
serve as literal mediating links in the perceptual chain: they stand between (both spatially and causally) 
external things themselves, and the brain events that occasion our perceptual awareness (cf. Prin. 4:196). In 
veridical sensation, the immediate objects o f sensory awareness are not states o f our sense organs and 
nerves— much less are they external things themselves. Rather, the immediate objects of 
awareness— whether in veridical sensation, or dreams— are the mind's ideas. Descartes thinks that the fact of 
physiological mediation helps explain delusional ideas:
[l]t is the soul which sees, and not the eye; and it does not see directly, but only by means o f the 
brain. That is why madmen and those who are asleep often see, or think they see, various objects 
which are nevertheless not before their eyes: namely, certain vapours disturb their brain and 
arrange those o f its parts normally engaged in vision exactly as they would be if these objects 
were present. (Optics, AT 6:141; cf. Med. 6., AT 7:85ff; Passions 26)
Various passages o f the Meditations lay important groundwork for this theory o f perception. For instance,
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one of the messages of the wax passage is that sensory awareness does not reach to external things 
themselves:
We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its 
colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more ado that knowledge of the wax 
comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But then if 1 look out 
of the window and see men crossing the square, as 1 just happen to have done, 1 normally say 
that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and 
coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. (Med. 2, AT 7:32)
Descartes thinks we're apt to be “tricked by ordinary ways of talking” (ibid.). In colloquial contexts we don't 
say it seems there are men outside the window; we say we see them. But that this is our ordinary way of 
talking does not help clarify the metaphysical nature of perception. These ordinary ways of talking do 
suggest something about our ordinary ways of judging, namely that judgments about external things are not 
the result of complex, conscious inference, as if: “Well, I appear to be awake, and the window pane looks 
clean, and there's plenty of light outside, and so on, and I thus conclude that I am seeing men outside the 
window.” But again, from facts about our ordinary ways of judgment formation it does not follow that we 
directly perceive external things themselves. (To suppose otherwise is to conflate epistemic directness and 
perceptual directness.) When all is considered carefully, Descartes thinks we should conclude that our 
perception does not, strictly speaking, extend beyond the mind's own ideas. This is an important basis of the 
mind-better-known-than-body doctrine. In the concluding paragraph of the Second Meditation, Descartes 
writes:
I see that without any effort I have now finally got back to where I wanted. I now know that even 
bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect 
alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being 
understood; and in view of this I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident 
perception of my own mind than of anything else. (Med. 2, AT 7:34)
It is generally overlooked that the m i n d - bet let •- k n o w n -1 h a n - b o d y doctrine is intended as a comparative rather 
than a superlative thesis. For Descartes, the only superlative perceptual state is that of clarity and 
distinctness: only it is correctly characterized as our epistemic best. While holding that introspective 
judgments are privileged, Descartes regards them as nonetheless subject to error. Even introspective 
perception—e.g., our awareness of occurrent pains and other sensations—must be rendered clear and distinct 
to be counted among our epistemic best. Such matters are clearly and distinctly perceivable, writes Descartes,
.. .provided we take great care in our judgements concerning them to include no more than what 
is strictly contained in our perception—no more than that of which we have inner awareness. But 
this is a very difficult rule to observe, at least with regard to sensations. (Prin. 1:66, AT 8a:32; 
cf. Prin. 1:68)
Elsewhere, Descartes writes that we do “frequently make mistakes, even in our judgements concerning pain” 
{Prin. 1:67). These mistakes arise because “people commonly confuse this perception [of pain] with an 
obscure judgement they make concerning the nature of something which they think exists in the painful spot 
and which they suppose to resemble the sensation of pain” {Prin. 1:46, AT 8a:22), For Descartes, the key to 
infallibility is not simply that the mind's attention is on its ideas, but that it renders its ideas clear and distinct.
But how could I be mistaken in judging, say, that I seem to see a speckled hen with two specklesl Some 
philosophers hold that such judgments are infallible. Descartes holds, to the contrary, that we can be 
mistaken—quite simply, by thinking confusedly. To help appreciate his view, notice that our question is the 
same, in kind, as asking whether I might be mistaken in judging that I seem to see a speckled hen with two 
hundred forty seven speckles. Of course I might be confused in that case. (Indeed, it is plausible to hold that
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only in confusion could my thought seem like that.) Yet there is no relevant difference that would explain 
why the one judgm ent is infallible (not merely correct), while the other is fallible. For Descartes, both are 
fallible; the relevant consideration distinguishing their susceptibility to error is that the two-speckled case is 
so much easier to render clear and distinct. But though simpler ideas are generally easier to make clear and 
distinct, simplicity is not a requirement: “A concept is not any more distinct because we include less in it; its 
distinctness simply depends on our carefully distinguishing what we do include in it from everything else” 
(Prin. 1:63, AT 8a:31; cf. Prin. 1:45).
Though Descartes is quite clear as to the fallibility o f introspective judgm ents, people widely attribute to him 
a variety o f related doctrines that he rejects. Compare the doctrines o f the infallibility o f the 
mental— roughly, the doctrine that sincere introspective judgm ents are always true; the indubitability o f the 
mental— roughly, that sincere introspective judgm ents are indefeasible; and omniscience with respect to the 
mental— roughly, that one has Knowledge o f every true proposition about one's own present contents of 
consciousness. (There is some variation in the way these doctrines are formulated in the literature.) Consider 
two key texts often cited by those who attribute such doctrines to Descartes:
I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called “having a 
sensory perception” is strictly ju st this, and in this restricted sense o f the term it is simply 
thinking. (Med. 2, AT 7:29)
Now as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered solely in themselves and I do 
not refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking be false; for whether it is a goat or a 
chimera that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the former as the latter. As for the 
will and the emotions, here too one need not worry about falsity; for even if  the things which I 
may desire are wicked or even non-existent, that does not make it any less true that I desire them.
Thus the only remaining thoughts where I must be on my guard against making a mistake are 
judgements. (Med. 3, AT 7:37)
On close inspection, these texts make no claim about the possibility o f introspective judgm ent error, because 
these texts are not about formedjudgments. In these passages Descartes is isolating the components o f 
judgment. His two-faculty theory o f judgm ent requires an interaction between the perceptions o f the intellect 
and the will's assent (a theory elaborated in the Fourth Meditation). A sine qua non o f judgm ent error is that 
there be an act o f judgm ent, but acts o f judgm ent require both a perceptual act and a volitional act. Descartes' 
claim that mere seemings “cannot strictly speaking be false” is therefore innocuous: for in isolating the mere 
seeming, he isolates the perceptual from the volitional. My merely seeming to see a speckled hen with two 
speckles could not,/?er se, involve judgm ent error, because it does not involve judgment.
Further reading: On discussions o f truth criteria in the 16th and 17th centuries, see Popkin (1979). On 
Descartes' doctrine o f ideas, see Chappell (1986), Hoffman (1996), Jolley (1990), and Nelson (1997). On the 
defeasibility o f clear and distinct perception (including the cogito), see Newman and Nelson (1999). On 
contemporary treatments o f infallibility, indubitability, and omniscience, see Alston (1989) and Audi (1993).
6. Cartesian Circle
In Section 5.1, we left off with the fourth paragraph o f the Third Meditation. That passage makes clear that 
the Evil Genius Doubt undermines even clear and distinct perception. In his Principles treatment, Descartes 
summarizes the broader problem:
The mind, then, knowing itself, but still in doubt about all other things, looks around in all 
directions in order to extend its knowledge [cognitionem] further. ... Next, it finds certain 
common notions from which it constructs various proofs; and, for as long as it attends to them, it
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is completely convinced of their truth. ... But it cannot attend to them all the time; and 
subsequently, when it happens that it remembers a conclusion without attending to the sequence 
which enables it to be demonstrated, recalling that it is still ignorant as to whether it may have 
been created with the kind of nature that makes it go wrong even in matters which appear most 
evident, the mind sees that it has just cause to doubt such conclusions, and that the possession of 
certain knowledge [scientiam] will not be possible until it has come to know the author of its 
being. (Prin. 1.13, AT 8a:9-10)
How can we overcome this lingering hyperbolic doubt? At the close of the fourth paragraph of the Third 
Meditation, Descartes lays out an ambitious plan: “in order to remove even this slight reason for doubt, as 
soon as the opportunity arises 1 must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a 
deceiver” (Med. 3, AT 7:36).
The broader argument that unfolds has seemed to many readers to be viciously circular—the so-called 
Cartesian Circle. Descartes first argues from clearly and distinctly perceived premises to the conclusion that a 
non-deceiving God exists; he then argues from the premise that a non-deceiving God exists to the conclusion 
that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true. The worry is that he presupposes the C&D Rule in the 
effort to prove the C&D Rule. In what follows, 1 first clarify the key steps in the broader argument for the 
divine guarantee of the C&D Rule. 1 then turn to the Cartesian Circle.
6.1 Establishing the Divine Guarantee of the C&D Rule
Descartes' broader argument unfolds in two main steps. The first step is to argue for the conclusion that an 
all-perfect God exists—a case he makes in the Third Meditation. (The Fifth Meditation advances a further 
such argument.) Though there is much of interest to say about his case for an all-perfect God, it will not be 
considered here, in the interests of space, and of focusing on epistemological issues.
The second main step is to argue from the premise (now established) that an all-perfect God exists, to the 
general veracity of the C&D Rule—the conclusion that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true.
As Descartes tells us: “In the Fourth Meditation it is proved that everything that we clearly and distinctly 
perceive is true” (Synopsis, AT 7:15). It is this second main step of the broader argument that 1 want to 
develop here.
It is tempting to suppose that the second main step is unneeded. For is not the C&D Rule a straightforward 
consequence of there being an all-perfect God? This is too fast. It is by no means obvious why only the C&D 
Rule would be a straightforward consequence, but not also a more general infallibility of all our judgments. 
Essentially this point is made in the First Meditation, immediately upon introducing the sceptical hypothesis 
that a supremely powerful but deceitful creator “made me the kind of creature that 1 am”: the meditator 
notices that this sceptical hypothesis is at odds with the standard view of the creator, as being not only 
supremely powerful but “supremely good,” adding:
But if it were inconsistent with his goodness to have created me such that 1 am deceived all the 
time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be deceived even 
occasionally; yet this last assertion cannot be made. (Med. 1, AT 7:21)
In short, the most obvious upshot of an all-perfect creator would seem to be the following perfectly general 
rule for truth: I f  I  form  a judgment, then it is true. But quite clearly, this rule for truth doesn't hold. The 
implied reasoning makes this a special case of the tradition problem of evil—applied here to judgment error:
1. There is judgment error.
2. Judgment error is incompatible with the hypothesis that 1 am the creature of a non-deceiving God.
3. Therefore, 1 am not the creature of a non-deceiving God.
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This First Meditation passage helps set the stage for the further inquiry that will ensue. It anticipates 
Descartes' Fourth Meditation plans to offer a theodicy for error. Indeed, the Fourth Meditation opens by 
revisiting the problem, but this time having just proven that an all-perfect God exists—a scenario generating 
cognitive dissonance:
To begin with, I recognize that it is impossible that God should ever deceive me. ... I know by 
experience that there is in me a faculty of judgement which, like everything else which is in me,
I certainly received from God. And since God does not wish to deceive me, he surely did not 
give me the kind of faculty which would ever enable me to go wrong while using it correctly.
There would be no further doubt on this issue were it not that what I have just said appears to 
imply that I am incapable of ever going wrong. For if everything that is in me comes from God, 
and he did not endow me with a faculty for making mistakes, it appears that I can never go 
wrong. (Med. 4, AT 7:53-54)
In an effort to resolve the cognitive dissonance, the meditator begins an investigation into the causes of 
error—an inquiry that eventually results in a theodicy. It is in the course of developing the theodicy that 
Descartes makes his case for the infallibility of the C&D Rule—in effect, arguing that God is compatible 
with some error, but not with error flowing from clear and distinct judgments.
In the course of the discussion Descartes puts forward his theory of judgment, whereby judgment arises from 
the cooperation of the intellect and the will. The investigation concludes that the cause of error is an improper 
use of the will: error arises when the will gives assent to propositions of which the intellect lacks clear and 
distinct understanding. It is therefore within our power to avoid error:
[If] I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not perceive the truth with 
sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding error.
But if in such cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not using my free will correctly. (Med. 4,
AT 7:59-60)
The theodicy that emerges is a version of the freewill defense. Accordingly, we should thank God for giving 
us freewill, but the cost of having freewill is the possibility of misusing it. Since judgment error results only 
when we misuse our freewill, we should not blame God for these errors.
Not only is the theodicy used to explain the kinds of error God can allow, it is used to clarify the kinds of 
error God cannot allow. From the latter arises a proof of the C&D Rule. God can allow errors that are my 
fault, though not errors that would be God's fault. When my perception is clear and distinct, giving assent is 
not a voluntary option—thus not explainable by the freewill defense. In such cases, assent is a necessary 
consequence of my cognitive nature: “our mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assenting to what it 
clearly understands” (AT 3:64); “the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but assent to these things, at 
least so long as I clearly perceive them” (AT 7:65). Since, on occasions of clarity and distinctness, my assent 
arises from the cognitive nature that God gave me, God would be blamable if those judgments resulted in 
error. Therefore, they are not in error; indeed they could not be. That an evil genius might have given me my 
cognitive nature casts suspicion on these judgments. That an all-perfect God gave me my nature guarantees 
that these judgments are true. A clever strategy of argument thus unfolds—effectively inverting the usual 
reasoning in the problem of evil:
1. There is a non-deceiving God.
2. A non-deceiving God is incompatible with the hypothesis that I am in error about what I clearly and 
distinctly perceive.
3. Therefore, I am not in error about what I clearly and distinctly perceive.
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The first premise was argued in the Third Meditation. The second premise arises out of the discussion of the 
Fourth Meditation. The result is a divine guarantee of the C&D Rule.
By the end of the Fourth Meditation, important pieces of Descartes' broader argument are in place. Whether 
further important pieces arise in the Fifth Meditation is a matter of interpretive dispute. (Elsewhere, I argue 
that significant contributions are made.) In any case, the Fifth Meditation comes to a close with Descartes 
asserting that indefeasible Knowledge has finally been achieved:
I have perceived that God exists, and at the same time I have understood that everything else 
depends on him, and that he is no deceiver; and I have drawn the conclusion that everything 
which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true. ... what objections can now be 
raised? That the way I am made makes me prone to frequent error? But I now know that I am 
incapable of error in those cases where my understanding is transparently clear. ... And now it is 
possible for me to achieve full and certain knowledge of countless matters, both concerning God 
himself and other things whose nature is intellectual, and also concerning the whole of that 
corporeal nature which is the subject-matter of pure mathematics. (Med. 5, AT 7:70-71)
6.2 Circularity and the Broader Argument
Students of philosophy can expect to be taught a longstanding interpretation according to which Descartes' 
broader argument is viciously circular. Despite its prima facie plausibility, commentators generally resist that 
interpretation.
Consider first what every plausible interpretation must concede: that the two main steps of the broader 
argument unfold in a manner suggestive of a circle—I'll indeed refer to them as ‘arcs’. The Third Meditation 
arguments for God define one arc:
Arc 1: The conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists is derived from premises that are clearly 
and distinctly perceived.
The Fourth Meditation argument defines a second arc:
Arc 2: The general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived is derived 
from the conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists.
That the broader argument unfolds in accord with these two steps is uncontroversial. The question of interest 
concerns whether, strictly speaking, these arcs form a circle. The statement of Arc 1 admits of considerable 
ambiguity. How one resolves this ambiguity determines whether vicious circularity is the result. Let's begin 
by clarifying what Arc 1 would have to mean to generate vicious circularity, and then consider the two mains 
kinds of ways that commentators prefer instead to construe the first arc.
Vicious Circularity interpretation:
Arc 1: The conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists is derived from premises that are clearly 
and distinctly perceived—prem ises accepted because o f  the general veracity o f  propositions that 
are clearly and distinctly perceived.
Arc 2: The general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived is derived 
from the conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists.
Thus rendered, Descartes' broader argument is viciously circular. The italicized segment of Arc 1 marks a 
revision to the original statement of it. Some such revision is needed for the vicious circularity interpretation.
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Thus interpreted, Descartes does at the outset o f the Third Meditation proofs o f God presuppose the general 
veracity o f clear and distinct perception. That is, he starts by presupposing the C&D Rule; he then tries to 
demonstrate the C&D Rule. Evidently, this way o f reading Descartes' argument has pedagogical appeal, for it 
is ubiquitously taught (outside o f Descartes scholarship) despite the absence o f any textual merit. If there is 
one thing on which there is general agreement in the secondary literature, it is that the texts do not sustain 
this interpretation.
How then should Arc 1 be understood? There are countless interpretations that avoid vicious circularity, 
along with numerous schemes for cataloguing them. For present purposes, I'll catalogue the various accounts 
according to two main kinds o f 11011-circular strategies that commentators attribute to Descartes. (The 
secondary literature offers multiple variations o f each these two main kinds o f interpretations, though I won't 
here explore these variations.)
Unbounded Doubt interpretations:
Arc 1: The conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists is derived from premises that are clearly 
and distinctly perceived—premises that are accepted, despite being defeasible, because our 
cognitive nature compels us to assent to clearly and distinctly perceived propositions.
Arc 2: The general veracity o f propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived is derived 
from the conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists.
Again, the italicized segment marks a revision to the original statement o f Arc 1 .1 call this an ‘Unbounded 
Doubt’ interpretation, because this kind o f interpretation is, in part, a consequence o f construing hyperbolic 
doubt as unbounded. The Evil Genius Doubt is unbounded in the sense that it undermines all manner of 
judgm ents— even the cogito, even the premises o f the Third Meditation proofs o f God. It is the 
unboundedness o f hyperbolic doubt that underwrites the No Atheistic Knowledge Thesis. But if  doubt is 
unbounded, then there is 110 circularity. For Arc 1 does not presuppose the general veracity o f the C&D Rule.
A question immediately arises for such Unbounded Doubt interpretations. Given that hyperbolic doubt is 
unbounded, why then are the arguments o f God accepted? Why does the meditator assent to them, given 
lingering hyperbolic doubts? The answer arises from our earlier discussion o f the schizophrenic manner in 
which hyperbolic doubt operates (Section 5.1). Lingering hyperbolic doubt can only take hold when we are 
110 longer attending clearly and distinctly to the propositions in question. While we thus attend, the 
propositions are assent-compelling: “my nature is such that so long as I perceive something very clearly and 
distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true” (Med. 5, AT 7:69; cf. 3:64, 7:36, 7:65, 8a:9).
The other main kind o f interpretation avoids circularity in a different kind o f way. Let's consider that 
alternative.
Bounded Doubt interpretations:
Arc 1: The conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists is derived from premises that are clearly 
and distinctly perceived—premises that are, however, taken from  a special class o f  protected 
truths, in that the general veracity o f  clear and distinct perception remains in doubt.
Arc 2: The general veracity o f propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived is derived 
from the conclusion that a non-deceiving God exists.
Once again, the italicized segment marks a revision to the original statement o f Arc 1 .1 call this an ‘Bounded 
Doubt’ interpretation, because this kind o f interpretation is, in part, a consequence o f construing hyperbolic 
doubt as bounded. The Evil Genius Doubt is bounded in the sense that its sceptical potency does not extend
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to all judgments: a special class o f propositions is outside the bounds o f doubt. Exemplary o f this special 
class o f propositions are the cogito and, importantly, the premises o f the Third Meditation proofs o f God. 
Propositions in this special class can be indefeasibly Known even by atheists.
N ot all clearly and distinctly perceivable propositions are in the special class. In order to extend indefeasible 
Knowledge to all such propositions, it is necessary to establish the general veracity of the C&D Rule. Thus, 
the need for Arc 2 in the broader project, and thus the lack o f circularity.
Though both Bounded Doubt and Unbounded Doubt interpretations avoid vicious circularity, each must 
confront a host o f further difficulties, both textual and philosophical. Avoiding the charge o f vicious 
circularity marks the beginning o f the interpreter's work, not the end. Charity minded interpreters must 
confront hard questions arising from their positions concerning the bounds o f doubt. The Unbounded Doubt 
interpreter must explain why, in the fina l analysis, Descartes thinks the Evil Genius Doubt eventually loses it 
undermining potency. The Bounded Doubt interpreter must explain why, in the first place , Descartes thinks 
the Evil Genius Doubt's potency does not extend to propositions in the special class. Space does not permit us 
to develop these further difficulties here.
The present essay surely paints a more sympathetic picture o f the Unbounded Doubt strategy, for that 
strategy accords well with the more global interpretive account that I have been portraying. Putting to the 
side my interpretive preferences, it must be said that both kinds o f interpretations are developed very subtly 
and persuasively in the secondary literature.
Further reading: For Descartes' response to the charges o f circularity: see the Fourth Replies. For texts 
concerning his final solution to hyperbolic doubt: see Fifth Meditation; Second Replies; letter to Regius (24 
May 1640). For a treatment o f the Fourth Meditation proof o f the C&D Rule, see Newman (1999). For 
examples o f Unbounded Doubt interpretations, see Curley (1978 and 1993), DeRose (1992), Loeb (1992), 
Newman and Nelson (1999), Sosa (1997a and 1997b), and Van Cleve (1979). For examples o f Bounded 
Doubt interpretations, see Broughton (2002), Doney (1955), Della Rocca (2005), Kenny (1968), Morris
(1973), Rickless (forthcoming), and Wilson (1978). For an anthology devoted largely to the Cartesian Circle, 
see Doney (1987).
7. Proving the Existence of the External Material World
The opening line o f the Sixth Meditation makes clear Descartes' principal objective, in this final chapter of 
his work: “It remains for me to examine whether material things exist” (AT 7:71). Establishing their 
existence is not a straightforward matter o f perceiving them, because “bodies are not strictly perceived by the 
senses” (see Section 5.2 above). Descartes' strategy has two main parts: first, he argues for the externality' of 
the causes o f sensation; second, he argues for the materiality o f these external causes. From these two steps it 
follows that there exists an external material world. Let's consider each phase o f the argument.
7.1 The Case for the Externality of the Causes of Sensation
Descartes builds on a familiar argument in the history o f philosophy, an appeal to the involuntariness of 
sensory ideas. The familiar argument is articulated back in the Third Meditation. Speaking o f his apparently 
adventitious ideas (putative sensations), the meditator remarks:
I know by experience that these ideas do not depend on my will, and hence that they do not 
depend simply on me. Frequently I notice them even when I do not want to: now, for example, I 
feel the heat whether I want to or not, and this is why I think that this sensation or idea o f heat 
comes to me from something other than myself, namely the heat o f the fire by which I am sitting.
(Med. 3, AT 7:38)
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At this Third Meditation juncture, the meditator remains in doubt about the existence of anything but 
himself—that is, /?wmj//’insofar as he is a thinking thing, a mind. The familiar, involuntariness argument 
amounts to this:
1. Sensations come to me involuntarily (I'm unaware of causing them with my will).
2. Therefore, sensations are caused by something external to me.
3. Therefore, there exists something external to my mind—an external world.
Though some such involuntariness argument has convinced many philosophers, the inference from 1 to 2 
does not hold up to methodic doubt, as the meditator explains:
Then again, although these [apparently adventitious] ideas do not depend on my will, it does not 
follow that they must come from things located outside me. Just as the impulses which I was 
speaking of a moment ago seem opposed to my will even though they are within me, so there 
may be some other faculty not yet fully known to me, which produces these ideas without any 
assistance from external things; this is, after all, just how I have always thought ideas are 
produced in me when I am dreaming. (Med. 3, AT 7:39)
Methodic doubt raises the problem of the existence of the external world. For all I Know, my “waking” 
experiences are produced by processes similar to those producing my dreams. I cannot with certainty rule out 
the hypothesis that my sensations are produced by a subconscious faculty of my mind, rather than by external 
objects. For all I Know, there might not be an external world. My inability to rule out this sceptical 
hypothesis explains why the familiar involuntariness argument fails. For the inference from 1 to 2 
presupposes exactly what is at issue—that involuntarily ideas are not caused by a subconscious faculty of my 
mind.
Many philosophers have assumed that we lack the epistemic resources to solve this sceptical problem. For 
example, Hume writes:
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external 
objects ... and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself... or from some other 
cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise 
not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. ... It is a question of fact, 
whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects ... But here experience is, 
and must be entirely silent. (Enquvy  Sec. 12)
Interestingly, Descartes would agree that experiential resources cannot solve the problem. By the Sixth 
Meditation, however, Descartes purports to have the innate resources he needs to solve it—namely, the 
innate ideas of mind and body. Among the metaphysical theses he develops is that mind and body have 
wholly distinct essences: the essence of thinking substance is pure thought; the essence of body is pure 
extension. In a remarkable maneuver, Descartes invokes this distinction to refute the sceptical worry that 
sensations are produced by a subconscious faculty of the mind: “nothing can be in me, that is to say, in my 
mind, of which I am not aware,” and this “follows from the fact that the soul is distinct from the body and 
that its essence is to think” (1640 letter, AT 3:273). This result allows Descartes to supplement the 
involuntariness argument, thereby strengthening the inference from line 1 to line 2. For from the additional 
premise that nothing can be in my mind o f  which I  am unaware, it follows that if sensation were being 
produced by activity in my mind, then I'd be aware of that activity on the occasion of its operation. Since I'm 
not thus aware, it follows that my sensations are produced by causes external to my mind. The cause, remarks 
the meditator,
cannot be in me, since clearly it presupposes no intellectual act [viz., no volition] on my part, 
and the ideas in question are produced without my cooperation and often even against my will.
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So the only alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me ... (Med. 6, AT 7:79)
If  follows that there exists an external world that causes my sensation. It remains to be shown that the 
external causes are material objects.
7.2. The Case for the Materiality of the Causes of Sensation
On Descartes' analysis, the possible options for the external cause o f sensation are three:
a. God
b. material/corporeal substance
c. some other created substance
That is, the cause is either an infinite substance (God), or finite substance; and if  finite, then either corporeal, 
or something else. Descartes eliminates options (a) and (c) by appeal to God being no deceiver:
But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not transmit the ideas to me either 
directly from himself, or indirectly, via some creature ... For God has given me no faculty at all 
fo r  recognizing any such source for these ideas; on the contrary, he has given me a great 
propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things 
exist. (Med. 6, AT 7:79-80, italics added)
This is a highly problematic passage. The “great propensity” here referred to is not the irresistible 
compulsion o f clear and distinct perception, and yet Descartes is nonetheless invoking a divine guarantee.
The moves Descartes is here making raise difficult interpretive questions. According to the early position o f 
the Meditations, we're to withhold judgm ent except when our perception is clear and distinct. Yet here, 
Descartes appears to think we're licensed to form a judgm ent in a case where our perception is not clear and 
distinct. Why does Descartes think this inference is licensed?
On one kind o f interpretation, Descartes relaxes his epistemic standards in the Sixth Meditation. He no longer 
insists on indefeasible Knowledge, now settling for probabilistic arguments. Though there are no decisive 
texts indicating that this is Descartes' intent, the interpretation does find some support. For instance, in the 
Synopsis Descartes writes o f his Sixth Meditation arguments:
The great benefit o f these arguments is not, in my view, that they prove what they establish ...
The point is that in considering these arguments we come to realize that they are not as solid or 
as transparent as the arguments which lead us to knowledge o f our own minds and o f God ...
(AT 7:15-16)
The remark can be read as a concession that the Sixth Meditation arguments are weaker than the earlier 
arguments about minds and God. O f course, one need not read the remark this way. And other texts are 
unfavorable to this interpretation. For example, in the opening paragraphs o f the Sixth Meditation Descartes 
considers a probabilistic argument for the existence o f external bodies. Though he accepts it as an argument 
to the best explanation, the argument is dismissed for the express reason that it grounds “only a 
probability”— it does not provide the “basis for a necessary inference that some body exists” (Med. 6, AT 
7:73). This is a puzzling dismissal, assuming Descartes has relaxed his standards to probable inference.
On another kind o f interpretation, the troubling argument does not mark a relaxing o f epistemic standards. 
Instead, Descartes is extending the implications o f his discussion o f theodicy in the Fourth Meditation. 1 
earlier argued ( Section 6.1) that Descartes thinks he demonstrates the divine guarantee o f the C&D Rule by 
showing that an all-perfect God cannot allow us to be in error about what we clearly and distinctly perceive. 
Suppose Descartes holds that there are other cases in which an all-perfect God cannot allow us to be in error;
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and suppose these other cases are circumstances like those instanced in the highly problematic 
passage—namely, the following circumstances: (i) I have a great propensity to believe, and (ii) God provided 
me no faculty by which to correct a false such belief. The upshot would be a proof similar in structure to the 
proof of the C&D Rule, though one that argues to a more expansive conclusion:
1. There is a non-deceiving God.
2. A non-deceiving God cannot allow me to be in error in cases in which (i) I have a great propensity to 
believe, and (ii) God provided me no faculty by which to correct a false such belief.
3. Therefore, I am not in error in cases in which (i) I have a great propensity to believe, and (ii) God 
provided me no faculty by which to correct a false such belief.
The conclusion of this argument presents a more expansive rule of truth than the C&D Rule, in that it 
licenses more kinds of judgments. Assuming Descartes could establish premise 2, he would be entitled to this 
more powerful rule, and without having relaxed his standards of indefeasibility.
I believe that Descartes holds that premise 2 follows from his Fourth Meditation discussion. Prima facie, this 
may seem ad hoc. But I believe that Descartes takes the Fourth Meditation discussion to clarify a more 
general circumstance of error that an all-perfect God cannot allow, than merely the circumstance of clear and 
distinct perception. In the relevant Sixth Meditation passage Descartes adds that from “the very fact that God 
is not a deceiver” there is a “consequent impossibility of there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot 
be corrected by some other faculty supplied by God” (Med. 6, AT 7:80). And elsewhere he writes that we 
would be “doing God an injustice” if we implied “that God had endowed us with such an imperfect nature 
that even the proper use of our powers of reasoning allowed us to go wrong” {Prin. 4:43, AT 8a:99). 
Assuming this interpretation is correct (I defend it elsewhere), Descartes' moves in the problematic passage 
are not ad hoc. And as will emerge, Descartes looks again to call on this same more expansive rule, in his 
effort to prove that he is not dreaming.
A final observation. It is often unnoticed that the conclusion of Descartes' argument for the existence of an 
external material world leaves significant scepticism in place. Granting the success of the argument, there is 
an external material world causing my sensations. But for all the argument shows—for all the broader 
argument of the Meditations shows, up to this point—I might be a mind that is linked to a brain in a vat, 
rather than to a full human body. This isn't an oversight on Descartes' part. It's all he thinks the argument can 
prove. For even at this late stage of the Meditations, the meditator does not yet Know himself to be awake.
Further reading: For a variation of the Sixth Meditation argument for the existence of the external material 
world, see Descartes' Prin. 2.1. See also Friedman (1997), Garber (1992), and Newman (1994). On the 
respects in which the Sixth Meditation inference draws on Fourth Meditation work, see Newman (1999).
8. Proving that One is Not Dreaming
By design, the ambitious project of founding Knowledge unfolds all the while the meditator is in doubt about 
being awake. This of course reinforces the ongoing theme that Knowledge does not properly include 
judgments of external sense. In the closing paragraph of the Meditations, Descartes revisits the issue of 
dreaming. He claims to show how, in principle—even if not easily in practice—it is possible to achieve 
Knowledge that one is awake.
A casual reading of the passage might suggest that Descartes offers a naturalistic solution to the problem 
(viz., a non-theistic solution), in the form of a continuity test: since continuity with past experiences holds 
only of waking but not dreaming, checking for the requisite continuity is the test for ascertaining that one is 
awake. Remarks taken from the final paragraph of the Sixth Meditation suggests this reading:
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I now notice that there is a vast difference between [being asleep and being awake], in that 
dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions o f life as waking experiences are.
... But when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and 
when I can connect my perceptions o f them with the whole o f the rest o f my life without a break, 
then I am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake. (Med. 6,
AT 7:89-90)
This naturalist “solution'’ prompts two obvious criticisms, both raised by Hobbes in the Third Objections. 
First, the solution runs contrary to Descartes' No Atheistic Knowledge Thesis: since the continuity test does 
not invoke God, it appears, as Hobbes notes, “that someone can know he is awake without knowledge o f the 
true G od'’ (AT 7:196). (Evidently, Hobbes too interprets Descartes as holding the No Atheist Knowledge 
Thesis.) Second, as Hobbes adds, it seems one could dream the requisite continuity: one could “dream that 
his dream fits in with his ideas o f a long series o f past events,'’ thus undermining the credibility o f the 
continuity test (AT 7:195).
Mirroring our discussion in Section 7.2, one kind o f interpretation has it that Descartes relaxes his epistemic 
standards in the Sixth Meditation. He's aware that the naturalistic “solution'’ does not stand up to methodic 
doubt, but he's not attempting to refute the Now Dream Doubt by establishing indefeasible Knowledge. A 
problem for this interpretation is that it does not square with Descartes' reply to Hobbes' first objection.
Writes Descartes: “an atheist can infer that he is awake on the basis o f memory o f his past life'’ (via the 
continuity test), but “he cannot know that this criterion is sufficient to give him the certainty that he is not 
mistaken, if  he does not know that he was created by a non-deceiving G od'’ (Replies 3, AT 7:196). Evidently, 
Descartes' “solution'’ is not supposed to be available to the atheist. Taken at face value, this reply rules out 
that Descartes' intended solution involves relaxed standards— indeed, it rules out any naturalistic solution.
On closer inspection, the Sixth Meditation passage does not put forward a naturalistic solution, but a theistic 
solution. The argument there has the meditator concluding that he is awake, in part, because “God is not a 
deceiver'’ (AT 7:90). How does the argument go? Recall, in the proof o f the external material world, that 
Descartes invokes the following (divinely guaranteed) truth rule, namely:
I am not in error in cases in which (i) I have a great propensity to believe, and (ii) God provided 
me no faculty by which to correct a false such belief.
I suggest that in the dreaming passage Descartes is again invoking this rule. The passage opens with the 
meditator observing the following:
I can almost always make use o f more than one sense to investigate the same thing; and in 
addition, I can use both my memory, which connects present experiences with preceding ones, 
and my intellect, which has by now examined all the causes o f error. Accordingly, I should not 
have any further fears about the falsity o f what my senses tell me every day; on the contrary, the 
exaggerated doubts o f the last few days should be dismissed as laughable. This applies especially 
to ... my inability to distinguish between being asleep and being awake. (Med. 6, AT 7:89)
Referring to the worry that he's dreaming as exaggerated suggests that condition (i) is met— that is, suggests 
that he has a great propensity to believe that he is awake. As such, he needs only to establish condition (ii), 
and he'll have a divine guarantee o f being awake. Notice that an important theme o f this opening passage 
concerns the meditator's faculties fo r  correcting sensory error— suggesting condition (ii). In context, 
Descartes' appeal to the continuity test can indeed be understood in conjunction with condition (ii). The 
meditator remarks (speaking o f apparently waking experience):
[W]hen I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and when
I can connect my perceptions o f them with the whole o f the rest o f my life without a break, then I
31 o f  35 7/12/2006 2:18 PM
Descartes' Epistemology http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/
am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake. And I ought not to 
have even the slightest doubt of their reality if, after calling upon all the senses as well as my 
memory and my intellect in order to check them, I  receive no conflicting reports from  any o f  
these sources. For from  the fa c t that God is not a deceiver it follows that in cases like these I am 
completely free from error. (Med. 6, AT 7:90; italics added)
Central to the inference is the meditator's effort to check the correctness of his belief, by means of his various 
faculties. The cases like these to which Descartes refers look to be those where conditions (i) and (ii) are both 
satisfied. Recall what Descartes writes in conjunction with the proof of the external material world: from “the 
very fact that God is not a deceiver” there is a “consequent impossibility of there being any falsity in my 
opinions which cannot be corrected by some other faculty supplied by God” (Med. 6, AT 7:80). On the 
reading that I am proposing, Descartes' theistic solution to the dreaming problem turns out continuous with 
his argument for the external material world.
What about Hobbes' second objection—in effect, that one could dream both (i) and (ii)? Descartes' response 
to the objection is somewhat ambiguous: “A dreamer cannot really connect his dreams with the ideas of past 
events, though he may dream that he does” (AT 7:196). No one denies the truism that the dreamer cannot 
really connect his dream with his waking past, which is one reading of this response. And the concession that 
the dreamer can nonetheless “dream that he does” is, on the most obvious reading, devastating to the broader 
account: for the account is supposed to entail, as Descartes writes, that “from the fact that God is not a 
deceiver it follows that in cases like these I am completely free from error.” So, if the dreamer can dream 
conditions (i) and (ii), then the implication is that God is a deceiver. If, therefore, the broader account is to be 
plausible, Descartes needs it that the continuity test cannot be performed in a dream—not with rigor, at any 
rate. What Descartes' concession must mean is that it can mistakenly seem to a dreamer that he has rigorously 
applied the continuity test, just as it can mistakenly seem to a perceiver who's wide awake that her perception 
is clear and distinct. Perhaps, then, in saying that the “dreamer cannot really connect his dreams with the 
ideas of past events,” Descartes means that the dreamer cannot rigorously perform the continuity test, no 
matter how hard he tries. By analogy, it is plausible for Descartes to hold that a drunken perceiver cannot 
really render her ideas clear and distinct, no matter how hard she tries.
Whatever is the correct interpretation, Descartes is cognizant of the impractical nature of proving that one is 
awake. In the closing lines of the Meditations, he thus writes:
But since the pressure of things to be done does not always allow us to stop and make such a 
meticulous check, it must be admitted that in this human life we are often liable to make 
mistakes about particular things, and we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature. (Med. 6,
AT 7:90)
Further reading: See Newman (1999), Williams (1978), and Wilson (1978).
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